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Loss of Consortium in Admiralty: A Yet Unsettled
Question
An action for loss of consortium, which is typically defined
to include the right to one's spouse's society, love, services, affection, company, and companionship, including sexual relations, is
generally allowed among American common law jurisdictions in
the instance of the death or serious injury of the marriage partner. 1 In the American admiralty jurisdiction, however, the existence of such a cause of action when the spouse is seriously injured is unclear.
The Supreme Court's recent admiralty decision in Sea-Land
Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 2 which permitted recovery for loss of
society and services by a longshoreman's widow, left confusion in
its wake as to a loss of consortium action in maritime law by one
whose spouse is injured but not killed. Admiralty courts subsequently facing the question in nonfatal cases are polarized. Some
lower courts, in allowing the nonfatal action, have seen a natural
progression from the Supreme Court's granting recovery for the
societal losses encompassed in consortium in the case of the
spouse's death 3 to extending relief in situations in which the
spouse is seriously, but not fatally, injured! A federal district
court and a court of appeals, however, denied the cause of action,
with the court of appeals interpreting Gaudet as suggesting that
no recovery should be granted in nonfatal cases. 5
This comment will examine the origins of the present uncertainty and will suggest a possible resolution of the question of
recovery in admiralty for negligent invasion of consortium.
1. For a discussion of the present status of consortium actions among the states, see
notes 21-24 and accompanying text infra. For typical definitions of consortium, see, e.g.,
lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 260 n.2 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 949 (1964); Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
340 U.S. 852 (1950) (overruled on other grounds, Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220,
226 (D.C. Cir. 1957)).
2. 414 u.s. 573 (1974).
3. ld. at 584.
4. Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd., 411 F. Supp. 677, 680 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (loss of consortium recoverable even when spouse is only injured); Pesce v. Summa Corp., 54 Cal. App.
3d 86, 92, 126 Cal. Rptr. 451, 454-55 (1975) (wife's recovery allowable); cf. Francis v. Pan
Am. Trinidad Oil Co., 392 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 n.8 (D. Del. 1975) (claim dismissed on other
grounds).
5. Christofferson v. Halliburton Co., 534 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1976) (wife's loss
of consortium claim denied). The lower court decision from the United States District
Court for the Western District of Louisiana is unreported.
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Loss oF CoNSORTIUM AT CoMMON LAw

The corpus of American maritime law is basically independent of the common law, but admiralty courts have often looked
to the common law position in addressing unanswered questions
in the maritime jurisdiction. 8 This practice has been specifically
applied in admiralty to questions regarding the protection of consortium and other societal interests between spouses and other
family members. 7
The traditional rule at common law was that a husband
could recover for loss of consortium caused by negligent injury to
his wife. 8 A major element of damages was the lost services of his
wife 9 in addition to the usual nonpecuniary entitlements such as
society, companionship, and affection. 10 The wife, however, was
held to have no property right in the services of her husband 11
and, lacking power to sue in her own right, could not maintain
such a cause of action. 12
•
Although the husband's right of action for loss of consortium
was clear if his wife was not fatally injured, no cause of action
existed if she died from the injuries. 13 If one's spouse was killed
as a result of a tortfeasor's negligence, early common law denied
any recovery for injury to the societal relationships of the family
members, since torts were not considered to survive death. 14
With the subsequent creation of wrongful death statutes,
however, states gradually began to grant recoveries for negli6. See, e.g., Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 408 (1970); The
Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199, 213-14 (1886); Schaeffer v. Michigan-Ohio Navigation Co., 416
F.2d 217, 221 (6th Cir. 1969); lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 25960 (2d Cir. 1963). See also G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAw OF ADMIRALTY§ 1-16, at 4547 (2d ed. 1975).
7. See, e.g., Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 587-88 & n.21 (1974);
lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 260 (2d Cir. 1963).
8. Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 CoLUM. L. REv. 651, 652-54 (1930).
9. Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 COLUM. L. REv.
1341, 1343 (1961).
10. E.g., Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 274, 78 N.W.2d 480, 481-82 (1956); Note,
Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1341, 1343
(1961).
11. E.g., Turner v. Heavrin, 182 Ky. 65, 68, 206 S.W. 23, 24 (1918).
12. Note, Judicial Treatment of Negligent Invasion of Consortium, 61 CoLUM. L. REv.
1341, 1344 (1961). In Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 278, 78 N.W.2d 480, 484 (1956),
wherein the Iowa high court granted a wife's recovery, it was aptly stated that "at common
law the husband and wife were considered as one, and he was the one."
13. Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808); 1 S. SPEISER, REcoVERY FOR
WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:1 (2d ed. 1975).
14. See Baker v. Bolton, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (K.B. 1808); 1 S. SPEISER, supra note
13, § 1:1.
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gently inflicted death, 15 which often included compensation for
the societal losses included in consortium. 18 Such statutory recoveries in death actions were not restricted to the husband as in the
case of nonfatal actions for loss of consortium. 17
The advent of the Married Women's Acts granting a wife the
power to sue 18 produced changes in the nonfatal actions for loss
of consortium. Gradually, most American jurisdictions altered
their position to extend protection to the wife's marital consortium interests as well as the husband's.t 9 Some states, however,
placed the wife and husband on equal footing by denying recovery
to both. 20
Presently, only ten states continue to deny recovery for loss
of consortium to both husband and wife. 21 Thirty-nine American
jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico,
recognize the cause of action of both husband and wife for loss of
consortium in nonfatal injury cases. 22 Three states have taken no
15. See 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 13, § 1:9.
16. E.g., Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776, 778 (Fla. 1954); Graysonia-Nashville
Lumber Co. v. Carroll, 102 Ark. 460, 470, 144 S.W. 519, 522 (1912); Fuchs v. Kansas City
S. Ry., 132 La. 782, 794, 61 So. 790, 794 (1912). See generally 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 13,
§ 3:49.
17. E.g., Davis v. North Coast Transp. Co., 160 Wash. 576, 584-85, 295 P. 921, 924
(1931); Brickman v. Southern Ry., 74 S.C. 306, 319, 54 S.E. 553, 557 (1904); Wells v.
Denver & R.G.W. Ry., 7 Utah 482,485-86,27 P. 688,689 (1891). See generally 1 S. SPEISER,
supra note 13, § 3:49.
18. Under the Married Women's Acts married women were released from common
law disabilities and granted the same legal rights as if they were unmarried. E.g., ARiz.
REv. STAT. § 25-214 (1976); Cow. REv. STAT. § 14-2-202 (1973); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 209, § 6 (West Cum. Supp. 1976); WASH. REv. CoDE§ 26.16.150 (1961).
19. For a discussion of the states extending a right of action to wives for loss of
consortium, see note 22 and accompanying text infra.
20. E.g., Baldwin v. ·State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965); Lockwood v. Wilson H.
Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-2-4 (1976).
21. Connecticut: Lockwood v. Wilson H. Lee Co., 144 Conn. 155, 128 A.2d 330 (1956);
Louisiana: McKey v. Dow Chern. Co., 295 So. 2d 516 (La. Ct. App. 1974); New Mexico:
Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211, 387 P.2d 321 (1963); North Carolina: Hinnant v.
Tidewater Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925); Texas: Garrett v. Reno Oil Co.,
271 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. Ct. App. 1954); Utah: UTAH CoDE ANN. § 30-2-4 (1976); Vermont:
Baldwin v. State, 125 Vt. 317, 215 A.2d 492 (1965); Virginia: VA. CoDE§ 55-36 (1974);
Washington: Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash. 2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953); Wyoming:
Bates v. Donnafield, 481 P.2d 347 (Wyo. 1971).
22. The following jurisdictions judicially declared the right to recover for loss of
consortium: Alabama: Swartz v. United States Steel Corp., 293 Ala. 439, 304 So. 2d 881
(1974); Alaska: Schreiner v. Fruit, 519 P.2d 462 (Alas. 1974); Arizona: City of Glendale v.
Bradshaw, 108 Ariz. 582, 503 P.2d 803 (1972); Arkansas: Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v.
Miller, 227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); California: Rod~iguez v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974); Delaware: Yonner v. Adams,
167 A.2d 717 (Del. Super. Ct. 1961); Florida: Gates v. Foley, 247 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 1971);
Georgia: Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953);
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definitive stand, although two of these have implied that recovery
would be granted, and the third has granted recovery to the husband. 23 In the case of the spouse's death, a majority of the states
allow recovery for injury to a widow's or widower's consortium
interests in wrongful death actions. 24
II.

SOCIETAL LOSSES AT EARLY ADMIRALTY

A.

Wrongful Death Actions

Early admiralty cases recognized a general maritime cause
of action for wrongful death. Some of the first admiralty references to elements of damage included in consortium were in those
cases wherein recovery for lost society, services, and comfort was
granted to parents, husbands, wives, and siblings of persons injured in maritime accidents. 25 Illustrative of the rationale used in
Idaho: Nichols v. Sonneman, 91 Idaho 199, 418 P.2d 562 (1966); Illinois: Dini v. Naiditch,
20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Indiana: Troue v. Marker, 253 Ind. 284, 252 N.E.2d
800 (1969); Iowa: Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N .W .2d 480 (1956); Kentucky: Kotsiris
v. Ling, 451 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970); Maryland: Deems v. Western Md. Ry., 247
Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967); Massachusetts: Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302
N.E.2d 555 (1973); Michigan: Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227
(1960); Minnesota: Thill v. Modern Erecting Co., 284 Minn. 508, 170 N.W.2d 865 (1969);
Missouri: Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo. 1963); Montana:
Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961) (applying Montana
law); Nebraska: Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953) (applying Nebraska
law); Nevada: General Elec. Co. v. Bush, 88 Nev. 360, 498 P.2d 366 (1972); New Jersey:
Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); New York: Millington
v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968);
Ohio: Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 22 Ohio St. 2d 65, 258 N.E.2d 230
(1970); Pennsylvania: Hopkins v. Blanco, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 116, 302 A.2d 855 (1973);
Puerto Rico: Gonzalez v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 385 F. Supp. 140 (D.P.R. 1974) (applying Puerto Rican law); South Dakota: Hoekstra v. Helgeland,78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669
(1959); Wisconsin: Moran v. Quality Aluminum Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d
137 (1967).
Ten states have statutorily created the cause of action: Colorado: CoLO. REv. STAT. §
14-2-209 (1973); Kansas: Act of May 4, 1976, ch. 172, § 5, 1976 Kan. Sess. Laws 663;
Maine: ME. REv. STAT. tit. 19, § 167-A (Cum. Supp. 1976); Mississippi: Miss. CoDE ANN.
§ 93-3-1 (1972); New Hampshire: N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:8-a (1968); Oklahoma:
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 15 (West 1976); Oregon: OR. REv. STAT.§ 108.010 (1975); South
Carolina: S.C. CoDE§ 10:2593 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Tennessee: TENN. CoDE ANN.§ 25-109
(Cum. Supp. 1976); West Virginia: W.VA. CODE§ 48-3-19a (1976).
23. Hawaii: Nishi v. Hartwell, 52 Hawaii 188, 473 P.2d 116 (1970) (implying wife's
right to recover for loss of consortium); North Dakota: Milde v. Leigh, 75 N.D. 418, 28
N.W.2d 530 (1947) (granting a husband's recovery); Rhode Island: Mariani v. Nanni, 95
R.I. 153, 185 A.2d 119 (1962) (implying wife's right to recover for loss of consortium).
24. Speiser identifies at least 30 states that permit recovery for the damage elements
normally included in consortium. 1 S. SPEISER, supra note 13, § 3:49.
25. E.g., The E.B. Ward, Jr., 23 F. 900, 901-02 (C.C.E.D. La. 1885); The Sea Gull,
21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (Chase, Circuit Justice, 1865) (No. 12,578); Plummer v. Webb, 19 F.
Cas. 891, 892 (Story, Circuit Justice, 1827) (No. 11,233); The Garland, 5 F. 924, 925 (E.D.
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justifying such recoveries was the principle espoused by Chief
Justice Chase in The Sea Gull. 26 He commented that "it better
becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required
to withhold it by established and inflexible rules. " 27
In a later case, The Harrisburg, the Supreme Court abolished
the general maritime wrongful death cause of action, 28 holding
that any such action would have to be created by statute as in
land based law. 29 The Court did not question the propriety of the
damage elements, such as loss of society, which had been previously pursued in wrongful death actions, but merely required
statutory authorization for wrongful death suits before further
recoveries could be contemplated for societal or any other losses
arising from death. 30
B.

Consortium Recoveries by Husbands in Injury Cases

In addition to the pre-Harrisburg recoveries for loss of comfort, society, and services in cases of fatality, compensation was
also awarded to husbands in admiralty courts for these elements
in cases of nonfatal injuries to their wives. 31 In 1912, the right of
a husband to maintain such a claim in admiralty was challenged
in New York & Long Branch Steamboat Co. v. Johnson, 32 wherein
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
a damage award to an injured steamboat passenger's husband for
his loss of her aid, comfort, and society. 33 In upholding the existence of the husband's cause of action in admiralty, the court cited
Mich. 1881); Cutting v. Seabury, 6 F. Cas. 1083, 1084 (D. Mass. 1860) (No. 3521) (dismissed on other grounds).
26. 21 F. Cas. 909 (Chase, Circuit Justice, 1865) (No. 12,578).
27. /d. at 910.
28. 119 u.s. 199, 213 (1886).
29. /d.
30. Id.
31. E.g., The Little Silver, 189 F. 980, 987 (D.N.J. 1911) (recovery for loss of injured
wife's aid, comfort, and society), aff'd sub nom. New York & Long Branch Steamboat Co.
v. Johnson, 195 F. 740 (3d Cir. 1912); Maryland v. Miller, 180 F. 796, 811 (D. Md. 1910)
(recovery for loss of injured wife's services and companionship), modified, 194 F. 775 (4th
Cir. 1911) (husband's recovery affirmed), cert. denied, 225 U.S. 703 (1912); The St. Nicholas, 49 F. 671, 673 (S.D. Ga. 1891) (action included claim for husband's loss of comfort
and services); accord, Plummer v. Webb, 19 F. Cas. 891,892 (Story, Circuit Justice, 1827)
(No. 11,233); Cutting v. Seabury, 6 F. Cas. 1083, 1084 (D. Mass. 1860) (No. 3521).
32. 195 F. 740 (3d Cir. 1912).
33. /d. at 742. The district court's decision enumerated the elements of Mr. Johnson's
claim, i.e., deprivation of the aid, comfort, and society of his wife. The Little Silver, 189
F. 980, 987 (D.N.J. 1911).
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The Sea Gull, 34 The Highland Light, 35 and Plummer v. Webb 36
-all admiralty death cases that had recognized loss of services
or society as proper damage elements in admiralty. 37 Although
The Harrisburg had invalidated the general maritime wrongful
death action, the court in Johnson found that the damage elements of lost aid, comfort, and society were still proper since the
husband's cause of action was a valid maritime tort. 38
After the Johnson decision, courts continued to allow maritime claims of husbands in nonfatal injury cases for loss of consortium, services, and society .39 In Allen v. Matson Navigation Co., 40
for example, the Ninth Circuit allowed an injured passenger and
her husband to recover for her injuries and his loss of society,
services, and consortium, which had been occasioned by the
wife's shipboard fall:u Similarly, the Eighth Circuit has affirmed
a maritime recovery for loss of an injured wife's services. 42
Although injuries to the consortium interests of husbands
have been compensated in admiralty courts, no early cases have
been identified granting the same relief to the wife of a man
injured at sea. 43

Ill.

CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMIRALTY

Since 1960, there have been two pivotal cases in admiralty
bearing on the question of consortium. lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques"" is the leading case denying a wife's maritime
claim for loss of consortium based on nonfatal injury to her husband. Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet 45 marked the redeclara34. 21 F. Cas. 909 (Chase, Circuit Justice, 1865) (No. 12,578).
35. 12 F. Cas. 138 (Chase, Circuit Justice, 1867) (No. 6477).
36. 19 F. Cas. 891 (Story, Circuit Justice, 1827) (No. 11,233).
37. 195 F. 740, 742 (3d Cir. 1912).
38. Id. at 741.
39. E.g., Allen v. Matson Navigation Co., 225 F.2d 273, 274 (9th Cir. 1958); In re
Wood, 145 F. Supp. 848, 861 (W.D. Mo. 1956), aff'd sub nom. Loc-Wood Boat & Motors,
Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306 (8th Cir. 1957).
40. 255 F .2d 273 (9th Cir. 1958).
41. Id. at 274, 282. Although the court declined to specify whether maritime law or
state law was applied in measuring the defendant's liability, the court did note that the
husband and wife would be permitted to bring their suit under either maritime or state
law. /d. at 277 & n.5.
42. Loc-Wood Boat & Motors, Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1957). The
district court decision specified that the recovery included damages for loss of services.
In re Wood, 145 F. Supp. 848, 861 (W.D. Mo. 1956).
43. See lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 265-66 (2d Cir. 1963).
44. 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963).
45. 414 u.s. 573 (1974).
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tion of the right to recover in admiralty for injury to consortium
interests in the instance of the spouse's death. Since these cases
significantly affect the resolution of the consortium issue in nonfatal cases, they merit close examination.
A.

Initial Denial of the Wife's Claim for Loss of Consortium

In the 1963 case of lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques,
the Second Circuit expressly denied a wife's maritime action for
loss of consortium. 46 In addition to denying the wife's cause of
action, which sought recovery based on injuries to her longshoreman husband, the court indicated that it would also deny a claim
for loss of consortium brought by the husband of an injured
woman seaworkerY The court disagreed with the Johnson holding, criticizing Johnson's use of overruled wrongful death cases to
support recovery for loss of consortium in an injury action, but
did not comment on any of the other cases that had awarded
damages to husbands of injured women in admiralty. 48 Thelgneri
court contended that the precedents cited in Johnson had been
overruled in The Harrisburg and went beyond the traditional
damages allowed in admiralty by granting relief for nonpecuniary
elements, such as loss of comfort and society. 49 No authority was
provided from general maritime law to support the claim that
nonpecuniary damages were not the tradition in admiralty, but
rather the court cited cases that construed federal wrongful death
statutes to deny such damages. 50
The court based its denial of the consortium claim on three
grounds. First, it found the common law jurisdictions in conflict.
At the time of the decision, thirty-one American jurisdictions had
decided the question of a wife's consortium action: nineteen had
denied the wife's action and twelve had allowed it. 51 With such a
lack of uniformity among the jurisdictions, the court was unpersuaded that the common law position supported granting the
wife's claim. 52 However, the court noted that if uniformity had
existed, it would have created a "gravitational pull" on admiralty
to allow the action. 53
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

323 F.2d 257, 268 (2d Cir. 1963).
ld.
ld. at 265.
ld.
ld.
ld. at 260-61.
Id. at 267.
ld.
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Second, the court looked to the Jones Act54 and the Death on
the High Seas Act (DOHSA) 55 for analogy. The Jones Act was
established in 1920 to allow seamen or their beneficiaries to
recover from employers for injury or death caused by the employer's negligence. 56 Negligence actions had been previously permitted under general maritime law, 57 but not when brought by a
seaman. 58 DOH SA, which was also enacted in 1920, provided
wrongful death relief for negligently caused death occurring on
the high seas. 59 Both statutes, as lgneri noted, 60 have been construed to deny relief for nonpecuniary losses such as loss of society
or consortium. 61 Igneri asserted that it would be anomalous to
allow recovery for loss of consortium under a general maritime
negligence action when it is denied in the statutory remedies of
both the Jones Act and DORSA. 62
Third, the court refused to extend the coverage of the doctrine of unseaworthiness to the wife's claim for loss of consortium. 63 The doctrine of unseaworthiness places an absolute duty
on the shipowner to provide a seaworthy vessel. 64 The shipowner
is held strictly liable for injuries to seamen caused by the unseaworthiness of the ship. Justification for such special protection
has generally been based on the high risk work of the seaman. 65
Igneri found it appropriate to limit the scope of the absolute
protection of the doctrine of unseaworthiness to the one directly
or physically injured. 66
54. 46 u.s.c. § 688 (1970).
55. 46 u.s.c. §§ 761-768 (1970).
56. For a discussion of the Jones Act and its purposes, see G. GILMORE & C. BLACK,
supra note 6, § 6-20, at 325-28.
57. Id. § 6-4, at 278.
58. E.g., The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903).
59. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970). For a general discussion ofDOHSA, see G. Gn.MORE & C.
BLACK, supra note 6, § 6-31, at 364-65.
60. 323 F.2d at 266 & n.21.
61. E.g., First Nat'l Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 288 F.2d 621, 624 (2d Cir. 1961);
Middleton v. Luckenback S.S. Co., 70 F.2d 326, 330 (2d Cir. 1934); Tate v. C.G. Willis,
Inc., 154 F. Supp. 402, 403 (E.D. Va. 1957); Gerardo v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 383,
385 (N.D. Cal. 1951); Westerberg v. Tide Water Assoc. Oil Co., 304 N.Y. 545, 110 N.E.2d
395 (1953).
62. 323 F.2d at 267.
63. ld. at 267-68.
64. E.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946); Mahnich v. Southem S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103-05 (1944).
65. E.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 94-95 (1946); Mahnich v. Southem S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 103-04 (1944). See generally G. Gn.MORE & C. BLACK, supra note
6, § 6-41, at 392-93.
66. lgneri recognized that the wife's relational interests may have been real, but those
interests ranked lower in qualifying for economic protection than the person of the hus-
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Some courts hearing injury cases subsequent to lgneri and
prior to Gaudet adopted the Second Circuit view that loss of
consortium is not recoverable in admiralty. 67
B.

Re-creation of the General Maritime Wrongful Death Action

In 1970, the Supreme Court removed the barrier that prevented admiralty recoveries for loss of consortium in wrongful
death cases. In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 68 the Court
unanimously overturned The Harrisburg, which had proscribed a
maritime wrongful death action absent statutory authorization. 69
In judicially declaring the existence of a general maritime wrongful death action, Moragne resurrected the admiralty concept of
liberal and humanitarian relief, which had been embraced in the
pre-Harrisburg wrongful death cases. 70 Moragne's broad declaration of a general maritime cause of action for wrongful death has
been described as reducing the specific maritime wrongful death
statutes, i.e., the Jones Act and DOH SA, to the status of nonstatutory restatements of the law. 71 Moragne left the various
potential damage elements of the re-created wrongful death
action to be sifted in the lower courts. 72 After some years of
refining the permissible damages, the lower courts had arrived at
no clear consensus regarding societal losses. 73
C.

Recovery of Societal Losses in Wrongful Death Cases

In 1974, the Supreme Court's decision in Sea-Land Services,
Inc. v. Gaudet permitted a longshoreman's widow to maintain a
Moragne wrongful death action under the doctrine of unseaworthiness.74 The widow's claim was allowed despite a recovery by
band. 323 F.2d at 268. As justification for that decision, the court stated, "When our law
imposes strict liability, it often accompanies this with limitations, not existing in the case
of liability based on fault, as to amount, as to person benefited, or as to both." Id.
67. E.g., Sanseverino v. Alcoa S.S. Co., 276 F. Supp. 894, 896 (D. Md. 1967); Davidson v. Schlussel Reederei KG, 295 So. 2d 700 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Rogers v. City of
New York, 46 Misc. 2d 373, 377, 295 N.Y.S.2d 604, 609 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
68. 398 u.s. 375 (1970).
69. Id. at 378, 404-05.
70. Id. at 387. See note 27 and accompanying text supra.
71. G. Gn.MORE & C. BLACK, supra note 6, § 6-32, at 367-68.
72. 398 U.S. at 408.
73. Most courts were denying recovery for societal losses. E.g., In re MN Elaine
Jones, 480 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1973); In reUnited States Steel Corp., 436 F.2d 1256 (6th
Cir. 1970); Savard v. Marine Contracting, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Conn. 1969). Contra,
In re Farrell Lines, Inc., 339 F. Supp. 91 (E.D. La. 1971); In re Sincere Navigation Corp.,
329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971).
74. 414 u.s. 573, 574-75 (1974).
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the husband for his personal injuries prior to his death. 75 The
Court announced that appropriate damages in a general maritime wrongful death case could include compensation for loss of
support, services, and society, as well as funeral expenses. 76
Gaudet did not face the issue of loss of consortium or society
in nonfatal cases. Recognizing, however, that wrongful death recoveries for injuries to relational interests were relied on in
Johnson to justify such a recovery in a nonfatal case, 77 a review
of the Gaudet decision is appropriate.
The traditional objections to consortium actions, which had
been raised and refuted in most land courts by 1974, 78 were likewise rejected in Gaudet for maritime wrongful death actions for
loss of society. First, the Court dismissed the contention that
societal damages would be too speculative by pointing out that
juries often calculate damages for pain and suffering and that
consortium losses would be no more difficult to compute. 79 The
Court noted that admiralty courts, as well as common law courts,
had previously awarded damages for loss of consortium in nonfatal injury cases. 80
Second, the Court perceived no threat of double recovery by
husbands and wives that could not be remedied by procedural
75. /d.
76. /d. at 584. The Court indicated that consortium encompasses society, and society
was defined to include "love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, and
protection." /d. at 585 & n.17, 589. The Supreme Court's recognition of services and
society as compensable interests is relevant to an analysis of loss of consortium or society
in nonfatal admiralty cases and will be more fully examined. The recovery allowed for loss
of support and funeral expenses has only incidental impact on the present question.
77. Notes 34-37 and accompanying text supra.
78. State courts have faced and resolved the following four basic objections to the
cause of action for loss of consortium. First, there is a potential for double recovery from
defendants if both spouses can maintain actions based on one physical injury. Second,
damages to the spouse who claims loss of consortium may be too speculative or remote to
justify compensation. Third, if the relational interests between spouses are granted protection, a barrage of others with similar relational interests may descend on the courts also
seeking protection for their interests. Fourth, some have urged that the decision to grant
or deny consortium actions should be left to the legislatures.
For penetrating analyses and treatment of these objections in favor of allowing the
cause of action, see Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115
Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974); Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973);
Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d
305 (1968).
79. 414 U.S. at 589.
80. /d. at 589 & n.25. Although the Supreme Court cited Johnson as an admiralty
case granting recovery for loss of consortium, it should be mentioned that the Court did
not thereby necessarily express approval of the Johnson decision, since the Court also
noted that lgneri represented a contrary view.
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controls and, in fact, declared that the only risk of a second recovery was for the loss of Mr. Gaudet's support, since he had previously obtained a personal injury recovery. 81 The Court emphasized that there was no threat of overlap between the husband's
personal injury action and the wife's recovery for services or society, as the right of action for those elements accrued not to the
husband, but uniquely to his dependants. 82 The opinion underscored the fact that no overlap could have existed in this case by
commenting that the wife's claims for services, society, and funeral expenses "could not accrue until the [husband's] death." 83
Third, a frequent objection to common law consortium actions has been that defendants would be subjected to a multiplicity of suits by any number of others with some relationship to the
physically injured person. 84 The Gaudet decision did not raise this
issue, but the Court apparently did not share such an apprehension. The Court indicated that remedy should be extended not
only to the spouse, but to all of the decedent's other dependents
as well. 85
Fourth, some courts terrane have argued that if change is
desirable, it should be effectuated by the legislatures. 86 The Supreme Court did not embrace this view. In fact, the Gaudet opinion judicially declared the right to recover societal losses despite
legislative implication to the contrary. The dissent noted that the
Jones Act and DOHSA have been read to deny consortium
claims, 87 but the majority was not deterred from permitting the
cause of action. 88
In addition to resolving the above objections, the Court also
turned to the common law position on wrongful death recovery
to find support in granting relief for loss of society. The Court
81. ld. at 591-92.
82. Id.
83. ld. at 592. This dictum was subsequently relied on by the Fifth Circuit as a clear
expression by the Supreme Court that the loss of consortium should not be recoverable in
admiralty unless the claimant's spouse is killed. See Christofferson v. Halliburton Co.,
534 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (5th Cir. 1976). For a discussion of Christofferson, see notes 92-96,
116-122 and accompanying text infra.
84. E.g., McKey v. Dow Chern. Co., 295 So. 2d 516, 518 (La. Ct. App. 1974).
85. 414 U.S. at 584.
86. E.g., Bates v. Donnafield, 481 P.2d 347, 349 (Wyo. 1971); Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211, 218, 387 P.2d 321, 326-27 (1963); Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash.
2d 345, 350, 261 P.2d 118, 120 (1953).
87. 414 U.S. at 605-06 (Powell, J., dissenting).
88. The decision expressly noted that DOHSA recoveries were restricted to pecuniary
losses, but the Court opted to permit claims for nonpecuniary losses under the general
maritime wrongful death action. Id. at 586-87.
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found what was referred to as a "clear majority" of the jurisdictions granting such recoveries. 89 Besides aligning the maritime
position with the majority of the states, Gaudet reaffirmed admiralty's adherence to the earlier proclaimed principles of humanitarian and liberal relief. The Court commented that it felt compelled to allow the remedy to comply with the "humanitarian
policy of the maritime law to show 'special solicitude' for those
who are injured within its jurisdiction. " 90
Thus, the Supreme Court clearly established protection of
relational interests in admiralty cases involving death. 91 But the
question of a claim for loss of consortium in cases of serious injury
was not answered. In cases subsequent to Gaudet, divergent views
on the issue have arisen.

D.

The Present Uncertain Status of Consortium in Nonfatal
Cases

In Christofferson v. Halliburton Co., 92 the only federal appellate decision since Gaudet addressing recovery for loss of consortium in a nonfatal situation, the Fifth Circuit took a strict stare
decisis approach. The court relied on lgneri as the most recent
precedent relating to a wife's claim in nonfatal cases, but did not
reevaluate that case's rationale. 93 Further, Christofferson simply
distinguished the recovery in Gaudet as a death action 94 and ignored a plea that the principles of liberality and humanitarian
relief affirmed by the Supreme Court should apply equally where
the spouse is only seriously injured. 95 Instead of seeing support in
Gaudet for the nonfatal claim, the court interpreted Gaudet as
being authority to deny the claim by relying primarily on the
Supreme Court's dictum in Gaudet that the wife's loss of society
and services did not "accrue until [her husband's] death." 96
In contrast, one federal district court and one state court in
post-Gaudet admiralty cases have declared the right of spouses
89. ld. at 587 & n.21.
90. ld. at 588.
91. Lower courts have consistently followed the Gaudet decision in wrongful death
cases. E.g., Skidmore v. Grueninger, 506 F.2d 716, 728-29 (5th Cir. 1975); Renner v.
Rockwell Int'l. Corp., 403 F. Supp. 849, 852 (C.D. Cal. 1975); Hammill v. Olympic Airways, S.A., 398 F. Supp. 829, 837-38 (D.D.C. 1975).
92. 534 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1976).
93. ld. at 1149-50.
94. ld. at 1150.
95. ld. at 1152-53 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
96. ld. at 1150 (quoting from Gaudet, 414 U.S. at 592).
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to recover in injury cases for lost consorti urn. 97 These courts were
unable to justify granting relief to the widow or widower while
denying it to one whose spouse is severely injured. Another federal district court implied that loss of consortium upon nonfatal
injury is recoverable in admiralty and noted that although
Gaudet did not directly face this issue, it apparently did not
disapprove of such relief since the Supreme Court relied on
Johnson in justifying relief for the fatal cases. 98
The present uncertainty generated by these opposing opinions is compounded by the conflict between the Second Circuit's
stand in lgneri against consortium claims by either spouse99 and
the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits' past histories of
granting recovery to husbands for loss of society, consortium, or
services. 100
A resolution of the conflict can best be suggested following
an examination of three factors: (1) the effect of admiralty's past
treatment of the consortium question, (2) the impact of the
changing common law position on consortium, and (3) the influence of the wrongful death recoveries for loss of consortium in
admiralty.

IV.

JusTIFICATIONS FOR NoNFATAL CoNSORTIUM AcTIONS IN
ADMIRALTY

A.

Consortium's Past in Admiralty

A basic justification for a remedy for lost consortium in injury cases is the simple fact that such recoveries have been previously allowed in admiralty. Despite the Second Circuit's illsupported statement that the tradition of admiralty is to restrict
damages to those of a pecuniary nature, 101 there is a substantial
history of recoveries of nonpecuniary damages in maritime courts,
which have been based on relational interests in both fatal 102 and
nonfataP 03 cases. Although the past recoveries cannot necessarily
97. Lemon v. Bank Lines, Ltd., 411 F. Supp. 677, 680 (S.D. Ga. 1976); Pesce v.
Summa Corp., 54 Cal. App. 3d 86, 92, 126 Cal. Rptr. 451, 454-55 (1975).
98. Francis v. Pan Am. Trinidad Oil Co., 392 F. Supp. 1252, 1257 n.8 (D. Del. 1975).
99. 323 F.2d 257, 268 (2d Cir. 1963). Notes 46-47 and accompanying text supra.
100. Allen v. Matson Navigation Co., 255 F.2d 273, 274, 282 (9th Cir. 1958); LocWood Boat & Motors, Inc. v. Rockwell, 245 F.2d 306, 311 (8th Cir. 1957); New York &
Long Branch Steamboat Co. v. Johnson, 195 F. 740, 742 (3d Cir. 1912); Maryland v.
Miller, 194 F. 775 (4th Cir. 1911). Notes 31, 39 and accompanying text supra.
101. lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 265 (2d Cir. 1963). Notes
49-50 and accompanying text supra.
102. Note 25 and accompanying text supra.
103. Notes 31, 39 and accompanying text supra.
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demand a like result today, deviation therefrom should not be
made lightly.
The past recoveries in nonfatal injury cases have involved
only husbands, but it is doubtful today that a restriction based
on sex could be maintained} 04 If a husband's cause of action for
loss of consortium has continued viability in admiralty, the wife
should not be denied equivalent protection for her entitlement to
the elements of consortium in the marriage relation. Certainly the
loss to a wife, who is deprived of the love, comfort, society, and
companionship of her spouse, is no less severe than a similar loss
sustained by a husband.
Both the Second Circuit in lgneri and the Fifth Circuit in
Christofferson felt justified in denying consortium recoveries to
spouses under the general maritime law, since recoveries for injury under the Jones Act provisions have traditionally been limited to the one directly injured} 05 Thus, it is argued that the
apparent intent of Congress to deny a statutory recovery for loss
of consortium should be carried over to the general maritime
negligence action. Following this rationale would avoid the anomaly of granting compensation to some spouses under the general
maritime law but denying it to others under the Jones Act.
In contrast to this reasoning it should first be noted that
historically recoveries for loss of consortium and services have
been allowed under the general maritime law despite the existence of the Jones Act and its restrictive rule} 06 Second, the Supreme Court undermined any reliance on analogy to the Jones
Act by expressly granting a recovery for· loss of society in a fatal
injury case, despite the denial of such relief under both the Jones
Act and DOHSA. 107 1f an analogy to the statutes was unpersuasive
in the case of general maritime wrongful death actions, the same
result should be expected in a negligent injury case.
In addition to consortium actions based on negligence, the
propriety of such claims based on unseaworthiness should be
examined. The Second Circuit hesitated to expand the strict liability doctrine of unseaworthiness to provide protection for the
marital interests of the spouse, particularly since that doctrine
imposes strict liability on shipowners. 108 The Supreme Court,
104. See, e.g., Duncan v. General Motors Corp., 499 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1974) (equivalent treatment of husband and wife constitutionally demanded).
105. 534 F.2d 1147, 1148-49 (5th Cir. 1976); 323 F.2d 257, 266-67 (2d Cir. 1963).
106. Notes 31, 39 and accompanying text supra.
107. Notes 87-88 and accompanying text supra.
108. lgneri v. Cie. de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257, 267-68 (2d Cir. 1963).
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however, undermined this position when it allowed recovery for
loss of society and services under this very doctrine in Gaudet. 109
The application of the unseaworthiness doctrine is arguably as
appropriate in the nonfatal case. In fatal and nonfatal cases alike,
the consortium interests of a seaman's spouse are subject to the
same probability of injury as is the person of the seaman in the
hazardous work at sea. As long as Gaudet remains the law for
wrongful death, it would be difficult to justify a contrary result
in injury cases.

B.

The "Gravitational Pull" of the Common Law

Although the common law is not determinative in admiralty,
it is persuasive. The Second Circuit found a lack of uniformity
among the courts terrane in 1963 when Igneri was decided, but
these courts are presently approaching unanimity in granting relief for loss of consortium in nonfatal cases. 110 This increasing
number of states permitting recovery has intensified the common
•
law's "gravitational pull" on admiralty.
The strength of the common law stand, with forty jurisdictions having allowed nonfatal consortium actions, should not be
ignored, particularly in light of the Supreme Court's willingness
in Gaudet to align the maritime position with a majority of only
twenty-seven of forty-four land jurisdictions. 111 Certainly if admiralty is to take a position opposite the onrushing tide of states
that allow recovery in injury cases, substantial justification
should be forthcoming. Additionally, it would seem highly inconsistent for the admiralty courts, which profess liberality and
humanitarian relief, to be more strict than the courts terrane,
which now generally grant relief for injury to a spouse's consortium interests.

C.

Analogy to the General Maritime Wrongful Death Action

With consortium interests so clearly protected under the general maritime wrongful death action, 112 it is worthwhile to assess
whether a like or contrary result is appropriate in the case of
nonfatal injury. The early general maritime wrongful death cases
provided protection for relational interests. Although The
Notes 63-66 and accompanying text supra.
109. 414 u.s. 573, 574-75 (1974).
110. Note 22 and accompanying text supra.
111. 414 U.S. 573, 587 & n.21 (1974). Text accompanying note 89 supra.
112. Note 91 and accompanying text supra.
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Harrisburg overruled those decisions, the Supreme Court has
subsequently exonerated the reasoning and policy of those early
cases. lgneri criticized the Third Circuit's use of the preHarrisburg wrongful death cases in justifying an inter vivos recovery for the elements of consortium, but it should again be noted
that The Harrisburg had not questioned the compensability of
lost society, services, or consortium for admiralty torts. 113 It only
announced that future wrongful death cases (whether for consortium or otherwise) could not be maintained without statutory
authorization. Thus, the Third Circuit's reliance in Johnson on
the declarations that societal relationships were protected interests in admiralty was probably not misplaced. In any case, the
Supreme Court saw the error of the Harrisburg rule by reinstating
the general maritime wrongful death action in Moragne 114 and
redeclaring the propriety of allowing recovery for societal losses
in Gaudet. 115
The most likely justification for overruling the Johnson view
and restricting recovery to fatal cases would be a reliance on the
Supreme Court's statement in Gaudet that loss of services and
society (and thus consortium) could not accrue until death. Such
was the Fifth Circuit's rationale in Christofferson. 116 Several factors, however, appear to discredit Christofferson's interpretation
of the Gaudet statement. First, the context of the statement does
not concern the issue of maintaining a nonfatal action for loss of
services or society. The Court was not facing that issue. In the
portion of the opinion containing the statement, the Supreme
Court· was drawing the clearest possible distinction between the
husband's inter vivos recovery and the wife's postmortem recovery to prove the absence of overlap between the claims. The crux
of the argument was that her claims for society and services were
unique to her, and he had no part therein. 117 No suggestion whatever was made that overlap would have existed had she made an
inter vivos claim for loss of consortium, joined with his personal
injury claim.
Second, elsewhere in the opinion the Court supported its
position that loss of society was a proper and measurable element
of loss in the case of fatality by stressing that admiralty courts
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

119 U.S. 199, 213 (1886). Note 30 and accompanying text supra.
398 u.s. 375, 378, 404-05 (1970).
414 u.s. 573, 584 (1974).
534 F.2d 1147, 1150 (5th Cir. 1976). Note 96 and accompanying text supra.
414 U.S. 573, 591-92 (1974). Notes 81-83 and accompanying text supra.
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had previously granted recoveries for loss of consortium in injury
cases. 118 If the Court was not expressing approval of the nonfatal
consortium actions, at least it recognized the reality of their past
existence. Similarly, numerous admiralty actions have been
maintained for loss of services in nonfatal cases, and the Supreme
Court did not quarrel with the propriety of these suits. 119 Certainly the loss of domestic and household services described by
the Supreme Court,t 20 for which compensation is permitted in a
wrongful death case, would be potentially a very real element of
damage in a case where the spouse is seriously disabled.
Finally, if the dictum regarding accrual of loss was intended
to preclude inter vivos recoveries for loss of consortium, no supporting justification was provided. It is unlikely that the Court
would summarily abolish future consortium claims in nonfatal
injury cases without some explanation, especially since the Court
had expressly recognized their prior occurance in admiralty. 121
Perhaps the better explanation is the one urged by the dissent in Christofferson 122-that the Supreme Court was speaking
to the accrual of the wrongful death cause of action as a whole,
which occurs after death. In any case, whatever the Supreme
Court intended in its dictum, it is not likely that it was a prohibition of nonfatal consortium actions.
Another possible justification for drawing the line of recovery
at death lies in the assertion that the injury to the marriage
relationship is remedied through the claim of the physically injured spouse in the nonfatal case, but that in the case of fatality,
the spouse can recover independently for societal losses through
a wrongful death action. It is not only difficult to formulate plausible support for that position, but such an assertion is also inconsistent with the Gaudet proceeding. If in admiralty an inter vivos
recovery includes compensation for both the physical injuries and
the injury to the marital relationship, then Mr. Gaudet made full
recovery for Mrs. Gaudet in his personal injury suit before his
death. However, a personal injury action in admiralty apparently
does not rectify the societal losses of the spouse. Otherwise, Mrs.
Gaudet's subsequent recovery would have been denied. It is
118. ld. at 589 & n.25. Note 80 and accompanying text supra.
119. Notes 31, 39 and accompanying text supra.
120. The Supreme Court enumerated the loss of "the nurture, training, education,
and guidance" of children as well as "[s]ervices . . . performed at home or for [the]
spouse" as compensable services. 414 U.S. 573, 585 (1974).
121. /d. at 589 & n.25.
122. 534 F.2d 1147, 1153 (5th Cir. 1976) (Freeman, J., dissenting).
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doubtful that Mr. Gaudet was held to recover for injury to his
wife's consortium interests up to the point of death and that she
was allowed to recover for the lost society only as it was intensified by his death. There was, in fact, no clarification that her
damages were to be only for any increment of loss caused by
death.
The existence of a cause of action for loss of consortium in
the case of death argues strongly for its uniform recognition by
admiralty courts in cases of nonfatal injury. The losses sustained
by the spouse of one who is injured may often be more intense
than those of the widow or widower, particularly in the face of the
possibility of remarriage by one whose spouse was killed, where
some possible fulfillment in a subsequent marriage relationship
is possible. For the one who remains faithful and devoted to a
permanently incapacitated spouse, however, there is no such opportunity. As great as the total loss at death may be, the surviving spouse is not left with the lifelong nursing of a loved one who
is now incapable of reciprocating with comfort, companionship,
services, and society in some degree. Thus, if the widow and
widower are entitled to remedy for lost consortium, relief is just
as appropriate for spouses of the maimed and crippled.
V.

CONCLUSION

Admiralty boasts of providing "special solicitude" for those
injured within its jurisdiction. 123 A remedy for one who is harmed
under that umbrella should be liberally granted, according to the
Supreme Court, unless it is precluded by "established and inflexible rules." 124 A severe physical injury to a man or woman may
result in a real and distinct injury to the spouse who loses the
consortium of the physically injured spouse. There are no
"established and inflexible rules" in admiralty that would preclude compensation for such harm. In fact, the history of past
recoveries in admiralty, the present trends among land jurisdictions, and the current decisions permitting such claims in maritime wrongful death cases all argue convincingly for a clear declaration of the right of spouses to pursue claims for loss of consortium in nonfatal cases. 125 Although a clarification of the law would
123. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 588 (1974).
124. /d. at 583.
125. It is significant to note that when the Fifth Circuit recently denied a consortium
claim that was based on a nonfatal injury, the court indicated that such a stand against
the action may not persist. The opinion stated, "Persuasive as the arguments may be that
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be proper for congressional action, legislative intervention is not
required. Congress has left the shaping of the law of admiralty
primarily to the courts, 126 and a judicial declaration of the right
of spouses to recover for loss of consortium in admiralty, based
on nonfatal injury, is not only permissible, but clearly warranted.
the law is changing, we hold that it has not changed yet . . . . " Christofferson v. Halliburton Co., 534 F.2d 1147, 1151 (5th Cir. 1976).
126. Sea-Land Servs., Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 588 n.22 (1974); Fitzgerald v.
United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963).

